BENHAM, Justice.

On April 4, 2011, appellant Antwuan Crayton shot and killed Curtis Lee Mack, III.1 We affirm his convictions.

The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts, show that appellant was sitting in his green truck when Mack approached him about driving too fast down the street earlier in the day. Witnesses testified that just a few hours prior to the shooting, appellant said he was going to "bury one of them" and the witnesses took that to be a threat against Mack and/or one of his friends who had witnessed appellant's reckless driving earlier in the day. Immediately prior to the shooting, Mack and appellant began to argue. Witnesses saw Mack beat his hands on appellant's truck and heard him use profanities. Appellant, who was a convicted felon and prohibited from having a gun, reached for a gun inside his truck and shot Mack five times. The medical examiner testified that Mack was 1.5 to 3 feet away when he was shot. Mack later died from his injuries which included bullet wounds to the torso that traversed major organs including Mack's heart, lung and liver. After the shooting, appellant fled the scene and threw the gun away in a body of water. About eight days later, appellant turned himself in to police and surrendered his truck which contained seven shell casings inside.

Appellant admitted to authorities and testified at trial that he shot the victim, but said he acted in self-defense. According to appellant, Mack revealed a gun in the waistband of his pants while trying to get into his truck and that this action by Mack caused appellant to fear for his life. No gun was recovered from Mack's body and other eyewitnesses testified that Mack was unarmed. Appellant testified that he kept his gun with him to protect himself from being car-jacked. Appellant also identified a picture of the gun he used to shoot the victim. The picture matched witnesses' description of the gun as being a black semiautomatic hand gun with an extended clip. Appellant also admitted he was guilty of being a convicted felon in possession of a gun.

1. Appellant argues that the State failed to disprove appellant's affirmative defenses of self-defense and defense of habitation beyond a reasonable doubt. "The determination of whether the State has met its burden to disprove the affirmative defense is for the jury, and the jury's determination in the present case that the burden was met was supported by the evidence." (Citation omitted.) Bentley v. State, 261 Ga. 229(2), 404 S.E.2d 101 (1991). Here, the State presented evidence showing appellant shot the victim, evidence showing the victim was unarmed, and evidence showing the victim was 1.5 to 3 feet away from the gun when appellant fired it. While appellant testified the victim was armed at the time of the altercation, the jury was free to weigh appellant's credibility as it did the credibility of the other witnesses, and it was free to reject appellant's affirmative defenses. See Hoffler v. State, 292 Ga. 537(1), 739 S.E.2d 362 (2013). See also Glenn v. State, 296 Ga. 509(1), 769 S.E.2d 291 (2015). The evidence as summarized above was otherwise sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses for which the jury returned verdicts of guilt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Accordingly, this enumeration of error is without merit.

2. Appellant alleges that the prosecutor made a misstatement of the law on felony murder predicated on possessing a firearm by a convicted felon during his opening statement. Trial counsel never objected to this portion of the prosecutor's opening statement. Inasmuch as there was no contemporaneous objection made, this allegation of error has not been preserved for review on appeal. See Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213(3), 675 S.E.2d 1 (2009). Also, there is no authority for the application of plain error review to comments made by lawyers during opening statements. Rather, we apply plain error review to the trial court's jury instructions (see OCGA § 17-8-58(b)) and to the trial court's rulings on evidence. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d). Opening statements are neither instructions by the trial court nor evidence. Accordingly, in the absence of an objection,2 this allegation of error will not be considered by the Court.

3. Appellant alleges counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the comments made by the prosecutor during opening statements and when he failed to move to suppress the search of appellant's cell phones. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pruitt v. State, 282 Ga. 30, 34(4), 644 S.E.2d 837 (2007). If a defendant fails to meet his burden on one prong of the two-prong test, then the other prong need not be reviewed by the Court. Wright v. State, 291 Ga. 869, 870(2), 734 S.E.2d 876 (2012).

a. During his opening statement, the prosecutor made the following comments:

Appellant contends that the italicized language is a misstatement of law and that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to object. While trial counsel did not make an objection, he did address the prosecutor's comments through his own opening statement. Specifically, trial counsel said in his opening:

In addition the record shows that at the beginning of trial, the trial court instructed the jury that anything the lawyers said was not evidence. After the close of evidence, the trial court also charged the jury on felony murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon:

Pretermitting whether counsel was deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor's comments, when one considers the record as a whole, appellant has failed to show any prejudice that would sustain a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Although he did not make an objection, counsel took action by responding to the prosecutor's opening commentary and by advancing appellant's self-defense theory of the case. Later on, the trial court correctly charged the jury on the law it was required to apply during its deliberations. Under these circumstances, this allegation of error lacks merit.

b. When appellant turned himself in to police, the authorities confiscated his two cell phones incident to arrest. A year later, the authorities sought and obtained a warrant to search appellant's cell phones. The following facts were set forth in the affidavit and application for the search warrant:

The superior court determined there was probable cause to search the cell phones and it issued a warrant which authorized the recovery of "[d]igital evidence such as photographs, text messages, call detail records, stored contact information, and stored/saved web site addresses" in relation to the crime of murder.

On appeal, appellant complains that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant and that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress. "Where, as here, trial counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress is the basis for a claim for ineffective assistance, the burden is on the appellant to make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been suppressed had counsel made the motion." Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731(2)(a), 770 S.E.2d 610 (2015). Appellant has not met this burden. Other than pointing to the affidavit, appellant has not shown what other evidence the superior court considered when determining probable cause. Without the record of all the evidence the superior court had in making its decision, appellant has failed to show that the motion to suppress would have succeeded. See Martin v. McLaughlin, 298 Ga. 44, 46, 779 S.E.2d 294 (2015). Furthermore, this Court has stated that

Id. at 734, 770 S.E.2d 610 (quoting Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 466(2)(d), 704 S.E.2d 794 (2011)). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.

4. Appellant alleges the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted several photographs,3 mostly culled from appellant's cell phones, over appellant's objection. One photograph is of appellant wearing a long dreadlock hairstyle; one photograph shows appellant holding a gun; one photograph appears to show appellant's shirtless torso and a gun tucked in the pocket or waistband of his pants; one photograph shows a gun with an extended magazine clip; one photograph shows a gun with an extended magazine clip next to a bottle of wine; one photograph shows appellant with long dreadlocks and a chain around his neck; one photograph shows appellant holding money; two photographs show appellant with a cigar or cigarette in his mouth; and the final photograph at issue shows appellant in a kitchen with a bowl and baking soda. At trial, appellant argued that the photographs were irrelevant, more prejudicial than probative, and impermissibly "attacked" appellant's character. The trial court reviewed all of the photographs proffered by the State and it admitted some, including those at issue here, while barring others.

The admission or exclusion of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and such determinations will not be disturbed in the absence of showing an abuse of discretion. Young v. State, 297 Ga. 737(2), 778 S.E.2d 162 (2015). Contrary to what appellant contends in his appellate brief, none of the photographs admitted into evidence at trial show appellant "cooking crack cocaine" or otherwise using or handling drugs. In fact, in its case-in-chief, the State did not introduce any evidence, photographic or otherwise, that showed appellant was involved in drugs. It was during the defense's presentation of evidence that the jury was first made aware that appellant had any involvement in drug-related activities when counsel introduced appellant's prior drug convictions.4 Accordingly, it was not the State that put appellant's character in issue with regard to drugs.

Witnesses testified that appellant's appearance had changed between the time the incident occurred and the time the trial took place. Thus, we agree that the photographs were relevant to show appellant's appearance for identification purposes. Since appellant threw away the murder weapon and the police were unable to recover it, the photographs were also relevant to show the gun that was used. In fact, appellant testified that the gun in the photographs was the gun he used to shoot the victim. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the photographs at issue.

5. Appellant contends the trial court erred when it admitted other crimes evidence showing appellant was arrested and charged for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The record shows the State introduced evidence of two incidents — one in 2004 and the other in 2007 — by calling the arresting officers to testify. The trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction immediately prior to the testimony of these officers. Appellant did not object to either officer's testimony and appellant was able to cross-examine each officer through counsel. After the officers testified, the State proffered exhibits5 associated with the arrests for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Counsel for appellant asserted on the record that he had no objection to the admission of the documentary evidence. Inasmuch as appellant did not object to the admission of this evidence and affirmatively stated he had no objection to the admission of the evidence in question, our review is for plain error under Georgia's new Evidence Code. See OCGA § 24-1-103(d).

In State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29(2)(a), 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011), this Court announced the proper analysis when conducting plain error review:

(Citations and internal punctuation omitted.) Here, appellant cannot show that the admission of this evidence affected his substantial rights. Appellant testified on his own behalf and during his testimony he admitted that he had previously been arrested for possession of a firearm while a convicted felon and that he was guilty of that charge in the instant case. Thus, the admission of this evidence had no effect on the outcome of the trial and there is no plain error.

6. Appellant alleges the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Because the underlying felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is independent of the killing, voluntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See Sims v. State, 265 Ga. 35(3), 453 S.E.2d 33 (1995). Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it did not give a voluntary manslaughter instruction in regard to that crime.

7. Finally, appellant contends the trial court made merger and sentencing errors. Specifically, appellant contends his conviction for felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm must be vacated under the modified merger rule announced in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 414 S.E.2d 463 (1992) and that his conviction for aggravated assault should have merged with the felony murder conviction predicated on aggravated assault. These arguments lack merit. This Court has held for the past two decades that the modified merger rule announced in Edge is inapplicable to felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See Amos v. State, 297 Ga. 892(2), 778 S.E.2d 203 (2015); Sims v. State, supra, 265 Ga. at 36, 453 S.E.2d 33.6 Therefore, appellant's conviction and sentence for felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is sustained.

As far as the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault, it too must be sustained. In this case, when appellant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of malice murder, the charge of felony murder (aggravated assault) was vacated per Edge. However, when a defendant is convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder and convicted of felony murder (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), the voluntary manslaughter charge must be vacated. See Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881(3), 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006).7 The aggravated assault conviction, which was still viable after the felony murder (aggravated assault) conviction was vacated, did not merge for sentencing purposes. Id. at 883, 635 S.E.2d 134. See also Poole v. State, 291 Ga. 848(9), 734 S.E.2d 1 (2012). Accordingly, there was no error when the trial court sentenced appellant for aggravated assault.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except MELTON, NAHMIAS, and BLACKWELL, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

BLACKWELL, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The Court concludes that aggravated assault and felony murder premised on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon do not merge, but in the circumstances of this case, I disagree. To the extent that the Court affirms the conviction and sentence for aggravated assault, I respectfully dissent. I otherwise concur fully in the judgment and opinion of the Court.1

To prove the felony murder, the State was required to show that Antwuan Crayton is a convicted felon, that he possessed a firearm, that he did so in circumstances that posed a foreseeable risk of death, and that he thereby proximately caused the death of Curtis Lee Mack, III. See Harris v. State, 291 Ga. 175, 178(2)(b), 728 S.E.2d 178 (2012); State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 697 S.E.2d 757 (2010); Shivers v. State, 286 Ga. 422, 423-425(3), 688 S.E.2d 622 (2010). Indeed, more than twenty years ago, this Court held in Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 602, 423 S.E.2d 255 (1992), that not all felonies are dangerous enough to form a proper predicate for felony murder, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is sufficiently dangerous only in some circumstances. See id. at 602-604(1), 423 S.E.2d 255. Moreover, we said in Ford that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon usually is dangerous enough to form a predicate for felony murder only when the firearm is possessed in a manner that is criminal for some reason other than the fact that the person possessing it is a convicted felon. See id. at 603-604(1), 423 S.E.2d 255 ("[T]he possession of the firearm by Ford, alone, under these circumstances which involve no assault nor any other criminal conduct, is not a felony upon which a felony murder conviction may be obtained...."). Under Ford and its progeny, to show that a defendant possessed a firearm in circumstances that posed a foreseeable risk of death, the State has to prove that the defendant used the firearm intentionally to make an assault, that he used the firearm intentionally for some other criminal purpose, that he possessed it in a manner that was criminally reckless or negligent, or that he possessed it in some other criminally culpable and dangerous way.2 See, e.g., Harris, 291 Ga. at 178(2)(b), 728 S.E.2d 178; Shivers, 286 Ga. at 424(3), 688 S.E.2d 622; Hines v. State, 276 Ga. 491, 493(3), 578 S.E.2d 868 (2003); Metts v. State, 270 Ga. 481, 482-483(1), 511 S.E.2d 508 (1999); Ford, 262 Ga. at 603 n. 4 (1), 423 S.E.2d 255. In this case, in which the State separately charged Crayton with an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, the State carried its burden as to felony murder by proof that Crayton intentionally used the firearm of which he was in possession to make an assault upon Mack. That circumstance not only rendered Crayton guilty of felony murder premised on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, it also made him guilty of the aggravated assault. See OCGA § 16-5-21(b)(2).

Putting aside whether the aggravated assault and felony murder in this case would merge under the required evidence test, see Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006), there are other circumstances in which the law requires merger. See Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 73(1), 709 S.E.2d 239 (2011). Under OCGA § 16-1-7(a)(1), "[w]hen the same conduct of an accused may establish the commission of more than one crime, the accused ... may not ... be convicted of more than one crime if ... [o]ne crime is included in the other." And according to OCGA § 16-1-6(2), one crime is included in another when "[i]t differs from the [other] crime ... only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest ... suffices to establish its commission." Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon requires no actual injury, and it is concerned with the risk of serious injury or death to which one is exposed when a deadly weapon — such as a firearm — is used intentionally to make an assault upon another. And at least as this Court has understood it, felony murder premised on the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is concerned chiefly with a death that follows from a convicted felon having exposed another to a risk of death by virtue of the way in which the convicted felon possessed a firearm, such as by using the firearm intentionally to make an assault upon another. In this case, in which the evidence shows that the same conduct amounts to felony murder and an aggravated assault,3 I conclude that those crimes merge under OCGA § 16-1-7(a)(1).

The only authority that the Court can muster for its conclusion otherwise is Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. 881, 635 S.E.2d 134 (2006). To be sure, we held in Lawson that an aggravated assault did not merge with a felony murder premised on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. But we did so without any discussion or analysis whatsoever. In Lawson, we chiefly were concerned with the merger of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder, and with respect to aggravated assault, we said nothing about the required evidence test or the alternative standards for merger under OCGA § 16-1-7(a). See Lawson, 280 Ga. at 883(3), 635 S.E.2d 134. Even today, the Court offers no reasoning in support of our summary holding in Lawson. To the extent that Lawson suggests that aggravated assault never can merge with felony murder premised on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, I would disapprove that decision. We ought not follow unreasoned precedent without reason.

On the facts of this case, the aggravated assault and felony murder properly should merge. Accordingly, Crayton ought not have been convicted and separately sentenced for aggravated assault. Insofar as the Court concludes otherwise, I dissent. I am authorized to state that Justices Melton and Nahmias join this opinion.